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This reply brief tracks Appellant's Opening Brief dated November 9, 2015 and responds to 
the response brief filed by Respondent City of Sandpoint ("City") on January 4, 2016. 
The City addressed some arguments raised in Appellant's Opening Brief, but not others. 
The City did not dispute that Idaho has adopted a conservative approach regarding incurring debt; 
and has one of the strictest constitutional debt prohibitions in the country. Nor did the City contest 
that the Joint Powers Agreement ("JP A''), including the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding 
amendment ("MOU"), was a multi-year agreement which obligated IHD to spend more IHD funds 
than it had during the year 2003 in whieh the JP A was entered. The City agreed on appeal the 
ordinary and necessary proviso was inapplicable although in its Complaint the City contended 
"[t]hat even if the collection and distribution of the ad valorem tax is considered indebtedness, it 
falls under the exception as an ordinary and necessary expense authorized by the general laws of the 
state to repair and maintain streets for public safety." R pp. 27-28. The City agreed Idaho has 
rejected the special fund doctrine; and Art. VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution applied to agreements 
between Idaho's political subdivisions, and was not limited to the procurement of goods and 
services. The only remaining constitutional issue not conceded by the City in its response on 
appeal is whether the JPA created a prohibited debt or liability for purposes of Art. VIII, §3. 
Disagreements remain. The City improperly attempts on appeal to bring the special fund 
doctrine in through the back door by citing McQuillan on Municipal Corporations and California 
cases. The City relies heavily on California cases which have no persuasive value in interpreting 
Art. VIII, § 3. The City forgets interpretation of the phrase "that year" in Art. VIII, § 3 means the 
year in whieh the agreement was entered. The City incorrectly argues Art. VIII, § 3 applies only to 
1 
future "fixed" obligations and does not apply to multi-year agreements which "apportion" future 
revenues. 
The City also argues IHD is not obligated by the JP A to levy ad valorem taxes in the future 
[it is], and the recent case of Greater Boise Auditorium District v. Frazier, 2015 WL 6080521 
(October 15, 2015) ("GBAD'') validates the JPA [it does not]. Rather, GBAD spotlights the 
illegality of the JP A and imparts that a multi-year agreement such as the JPA must contain a walk-
away prov1s10n. 
Based on these arguments, the City concludes the JP A complies with Art. VIII, § 3. IHD 
will show that each of the City's arguments is contradicted by Idaho case law invalidating the 
City's conclusion. Curiously, the City largely avoids analysis of Idaho Art. VIII, § 3 cases, and 
totally ignores the Idaho Supreme Court's definitions of indebtedness and liability in its analysis of 
the issues before this Court on appeal. 
Although irrelevant to the ultimate issues to be decided by this Court on appeal, the City 
made several misleading statements in its Statement of the Case: 
1. The City repeatedly uses the term "shared statutory responsibility" referring to the 
maintenance of City streets. See e.g. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. While not material, it is 
misleading. Under Idaho Code section 40-1333, 1 the City has primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of City streets. If IHD assists in City street maintenance, the City must reimburse IHD 
for any IHD work performed within the City. Idaho cities use their highway distribution account 
funds received pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-709, city levy proceeds, grants, and the cities' 
statutory share of Idaho Code section 40-801 revenue to fulfill the cities' responsibility for the 
1 Idaho Code §40-1333 provides: "Cities, with city highway systems, shall be responsible for the construction, 
reconstruction and maintenance of highways in their respective city systems, except as provided in section 40-607, 
Idaho Code. Cities may make agreements with a county, highway district or the state for their highway work, or a 
portion ofit, but they shall compensate the county, district or state fairly for any work performed." Idaho Code §40-607 
applies only to cities under 5,000 in population. Sandpoint is over that threshold. See Complaint, 1 I. 
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maintenance of city streets. All Idaho cities and highway districts operate under this statutory 
scheme; except the City of Sandpoint and IHD.2 
2. The City asserts a dissolution "election ... would have resulted in the dissolution of 
IHD." Respondent's Brief, footnote 2, p. 11. There is no support for this statement in the record 
and the statement is pure speculation. Had the election been held, the voters may well have elected 
to keep IHD intact. 
3. The City asserts IHD voluntarily stipulated to the injunction. IHD did voluntarily 
stipulate to the preliminary injunction (as opposed to a permanent injunction) with the exact 
wording of the stipulation indicating: "Any distribution made during the pendency of this case shall 
not be deemed 'voluntary' by IHD to Sandpoint." R. 177. (emphasis added). 
4. The City omits from its statement of facts it declined IHD's multiple requests to re-
negotiate the JPA. See Tilley Affidavit. R. 232-233 and Scot Campbell email, R. 241-242. The 
City does not deny it rejected IHD's offers to negotiate and settle this dispute. R. 45. Rather than 
discuss the constitutional issue with IHD and potential resolutions, the City immediately filed its 
third lawsuit against IHD, this time to seek IHD's compliance with the JPA. 
5. The City asserts that the order approving the settlement stipulation (R. 99-100) 
resulted in judicial approval of all details of the stipulation and subsequent JP A. In fact, the district 
court signed an order dismissing the case which referenced, but did not incorporate, the settlement 
agreement. There is no evidence the district court analyzed the terms of the stipulation for 
compliance with Idaho's constitution and statutes. There is no evidence the district court approved 
the terms of the JP A. 
2 Another exception is the Ada County Highway District and Ada County cities which operate under Title 40, Chapter 
14, Idaho Code. In Ada County, the highway district receives 100% of the Idaho Code section 40-801 revenue since 
the highway district has statutory responsibility the maintenance of city streets. All other Idaho cities and highway 
districts, including IHD and the City, operate under Title 40, Chapter 13, Idaho Code. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN IHD AND THE CITY 
The City agrees with most of the constitutional arguments made in IHD's Opening Brief: 
A. The City agrees the JPA is a multi-year agreement which applies in perpetuity unless 
mutually terminated. Respondent's Brief, p. 35. The City acknowledges the JPA was intended to 
be "permanent" which is why it had no provision for "renegotiation." Respondent's Brief, p. 16. 
B. The City agrees the trial court ruled a liability was created by the JP A. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 22. (However, the City argues the JPA multi-year liability is not illegal on 
the false premise that IHD is not obligated to levy taxes. Respondent's Brief, pp. 25-27). 
C. The City agrees, despite the allegations in its Complaint that the Art. VIII, § 3 
"ordinary and necessary" proviso is inapplicable to the facts in this case. Respondent's Brief, p. 33. 
D. The City agrees Art. VIII, § 3 applies to agreements between Idaho's political 
subdivisions. Respondent's Brief, pp. 30-31. 
E. The City agrees Art. VIII, § 3 is not limited to the procurement of goods and 
services. Respondent's Brief, pp. 31-32. 
F. The City agrees property taxes constitute IHD general revenues. Respondent's Brief, 
p. 31. 
G. The City agrees Idaho has rejected the special fund doctrine and the doctrine cannot 
be used to validate the JPA. Respondent's Brief, pp. 32-33. (However, the City attempts to 
resurrect the special fund doctrine by citing McQuillan on Municipal Corporations and California 
cases. Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-25.) 
H. The City agrees "the JP A does affect the ability of future IHD Boards to decide how 
its tax revenues should be spent." Respondent's Brief, p. 33. 
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Also, the City does not dispute that: 
1. IHD repeatedly asked the City to renegotiate the JP A and the City failed to respond 
or declined the requests; 
2. IHD's aggregate liability under the JPA exceeded IHD's 2003 revenues;3 
3. Feil and its progeny remain good law in Idaho; and 
4. An agreement made in violation of Art. VIII, § 3 is void. 
II. THE JPA REQUIRES IHD TO LEVY TAXES IN THE FUTURE 
The City advances a new argument not raised below which is now the City's fundamental 
constitutional argument on appeal. The City asserts, under the terms of the JP A, IHD has no 
obligation to levy property taxes in any future year. The City maintains since IHD had no 
obligation to levy taxes in any future year, IHD had only a contingent obligation to make payments 
to the City. Under such circumstances, the City contends the aggregation of payments is improper 
in determining ifIHD's obligation exceeded IHD's 2003 revenues. 
The City asserts: 
1. "Truly, if IHD elected to have no levy for a tax year, there would be 
no [IHD] obligation to pay [tax revenue to the City]." Respondent's 
Brief p. 25. 
2. "In reality, the JP A does not require IHD to levy one cent in tax .. .it 
creates no rights by the City to demand or enforce a tax levy." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 26. 
3. "IHD's former board did not obligate itself to perpetually levy real 
property taxes and pay the revenues from such levy to the City" 
Respondent's Brief, p. 27. (emphasis in original) 
4. "Nothing in the JPA obligates IHD to so levy, and thus does not 
create a liability which may or may not be payable by future revenue. 
3 The City does not dispute the estimate of the IHD obligation made in the JPA of$350,000 per year would exceed 
$20 million over sixty years and would, in fact, be infinite since the JP A has a perpetual duration. 
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This is the fact that renders all of the cases cited by IHD inapplicable 
and irrelevant to the issues at hand." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. 
So what does the JP A actually say? At clause 1, Revenue Distribution, it states: 
The District at the present time and in the future will levy and apply for ad 
valorem property taxes under the authority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40, 
Idaho Code. The District will pay over to the City all property tax funds from 
such District levies on all property located within the City limits. 
R. 39 (emphasis added). 
The plain language of the JP A mandates that IHD "will levy" taxes "in the future". The City 
attempts in its appellate argument to re-draft the agreement to change the mandatory "will" to the 
discretionary "may". "Will" means 
WILL, v. An auxiliary verb commonly having the mandatory sense of 
"shall" or "must". It is a word of certainty, while the word "may" is one of 
speculation and uncertainty. 
Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed. (1968). 
This Court held in Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 
639, 645-646 (2015): 
"When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language." Potlatch 
Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,633,226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010)." 
In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper 
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." Id. 
(quoting C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001)). 
The plain and ordinary language of the contract indicated IHD had to levy taxes in future 
years. Either the City ignored this plain language in the JP A or the City believes it does not apply to 
all future years.4 Since the key premise to the City's constitutional argument is false, the City's 
constitutional conclusion is wrong. 
4 It is not realistic for the City to suggest that IHD can choose to levy for some years but not for others. Under the 
"budget cap" statute, Idaho Code section 63-802, should IHD not levy real property taxes for a specific future year, 
IHD will be precluded, as a practical matter, from doing so in subsequent years. IHD cannot decline to levy in a 
specific year if it wants to retain the ability to levy in future years. 
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The City's position is also inconsistent. In a different section of its brief, when addressing 
IHD's penalties and interest argument, the City contradicted itself and conceded that the JPA 
"provided that IHD would levy and apply for ad valorem property taxes." Respondent's Brief, p. 
42. The context of the statement clearly refers to the "future years" language from the same JP A 
sentence. In this portion of its brief, the City argues IHD must levy and pay over to the City taxes 
and penalties for all future years. 
The City sued IHD and asserted IHD had an obligation to pay the City IHD taxes for all 
future years. How can the City now argue on appeal the same JP A language does not obligate IHD 
to levy taxes in the future? The City cannot have it both ways. 
Because IHD is obligated by the JPA to levy and pay over taxes to the City "in the future", 
the aggregation of all future JPA payments is required by Idaho Art. VIII, § 3. The amount IHD 
was obligated to pay to the City under the JPA exceeded IHD's 2003 revenue. Thus, the JPA 
created a multi-year debt and liability prohibited by Art. VIII, § 3. 
Even if, arguendo, IHD could choose not to impose its levy for any specific future year, the 
JPA still created a multi-year obligation to pay the City into perpetuity all revenue collected during 
those years when taxes were levied. This multi-year obligation, even if analyzed as a contingent 
liability, violated Art. VIII, § 3 based on GBAD. 
III. IDAHO DEFINITIONS OF LIABILITY AND INDEBTEDNESS 
The City admits the JP A created a liability if IHD levied taxes and does not dispute that the 
JPA is a multi-year agreement. The City does not dispute that IHD did not have revenue in 2003 to 
make all payments for the perpetual duration of the JP A. 5 Even so, the City continues to argue the 
JP A created no indebtedness or liability prohibited by Art. VIII, § 3. Art. VIII, § 3 provides: 
5 See Footnote 3 on p. 9 
7 
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other 
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any 
manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue 
provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified 
electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose .... 
Idaho Constitution, Art VIII, § 3 ( emphasis added). 
The City did not rebut IHD's discussion of the Idaho definitions of indebtedness or liability 
in pages 10-12 of IHD' s Opening Brief. Rather, the City quoted extensively from California cases6 
and other non-Idaho authorities as support for this Cowi to nullify the Idaho definitions of these 
terms. Why? Because Idaho case law contradicts the City's arguments. IHD contended in its 
opening brief (p. 11) and continues to assert in this reply that the JPA created an illegal debt and 
undeniably created an illegal liability. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined "debt" or "indebtedness," within the 
meaning of Art. 8, §3, as an obligation, incurred by the state or municipality, 
which creates a legal duty on its part to pay from its general funds a sum of 
money to another, who occupies the position of a creditor, and who has a 
lawful right to demand payment. 
17 Idaho L. Rev. 55 (1980), p. 59. Constitutional Debt Limitations on Local Government in 
Idaho Article 8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution, Michael C. Moore. 
"Liability" is more broadly defined as: 
' ... the state of one who is bound in law and justice to do something which 
may be enforced by action.' 
*** 
' ... the state of being bound or obliged in law or justice to do, pay or make 
good something; legal responsibility.' 
GBAD *8, quoting from Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 50, 129 P. 643, 649 
(1912). 
6 Compared with Idaho's simple, conservative approach to local government multi-year financing, California's 
approach is liberal and result oriented. California has engaged in the true lease/financing lease fiction rejected in 
Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931) and GBAD. See e.g. Dean v. Kuchel, 218 P.2d 521 (Cal. 
1950) and Rider v. City of San Diego 959 P.2d 347 (Cal. I 998). Idaho totally rejects the California approach and 
requires that there be a walk away provision in multi-year agreements. See GBAD. 
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The JPA created a multi-year legal duty for IHD to pay its property tax revenues over to the 
City, which duty the City sought to enforce in its lawsuit against IHD; a debt The City claims in 
its Complaint that IHD was bound in law or justice to make multi-year payments to the City; a 
liability. 
In GBAD, this Court reaffirmed the breadth of the liability definition. "[T]he term 'liability' 
is even more sweeping and comprehensive term than the word 'indebtedness"'. 
GBAD *8. GBAD analyzed an earlier Idaho case with approval, which stated: 
The framers of our constitution were not content to say that no city shall incur 
an indebtedness 'in any manner or for any purpose,' but they rather preferred 
to say that no city shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or 
for any purpose. It must be clear to the ordinary mind on reading this 
language that the framers of the constitution meant to cover all kinds and 
character of debts and obligations for which a city [ or other political 
subdivision such as IHD] may become bound. and to preclude circuitous and 
evasive methods of incurring debts and obligations to be met by the city or its 
inhabitants. 
Boise Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Boise City, 26 Idaho 347, 361, 143 P. 531, 535 (1914). (emphasis added) 
analyzed in GBAD *8-9. 
Based upon the breadth of Idaho's liability definition, there is no doubt that the JPA 
created a liability. 
IV. CITY ARGUMENTS 
A. The City Incorrectly Argues that Art. VIII, § 3 is Limited to "Fixed" Liabilities. 
The City introduces a novel argument not raised below: Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits only 
"fixed" liabilities. The City reasons the JP A does not create a "fixed" liability since the IHD "levy 
amount can freely change." Respondent's Brief, p. 22. The City does not tell the Court what it 
means by "fixed" liability. 
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Art. VIII, § 3 does not reference "fixed" liabilities or include any such limitation. The City 
has not cited a single Idaho case which limits the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition to one that is "fixed." 
Indeed, Boise Dev. Co. dealt with liabilities that were not fixed. In Boise Dev. Co. this Court 
analyzed a litigation settlement agreement between Boise and a development company. Boise 
entered into a multi-year agreement to channel the Boise River by building river banks and a road. 
The agreement included the statement: "In consideration of the foregoing terms and stipulations on 
the part of the party of the first part (Boise), the party of the second part agrees as follows: I. To 
dismiss the action now pending between the parties hereto .... " Boise Dev. Co., 26 Idaho 347, 355, 
143 P. 531,533. 
The obligations agreed to by Boise were not "fixed." The agreement included Boise's 
obligation to perform reclamation work in an indefinite amount of at least $5,000 per year over five 
years. It was probable that Boise would have to spend more than $5,000 per year on the reclaiming 
work but the amount was not yet identified. Id at 359, 143 P. at 534. Boise promised to build 
Riverside Drive within eight years, at a cost yet to be determined. Id. 
The Boise Dev. Co. Court held the multi-year agreement was prohibited by Art. VIII, § 3 as 
an illegal debt or liability, even though the contract was not for a "fixed" amount. The Boise Dev. 
Co. Court held Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits the pledging of future revenues whether the pledge amount 
was fixed or not. The Court rejected California case law as "not sound" when it came to 
interpreting Art. VIII,§ 3. Id at 362, 143 P. at 535. 
The City cites Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases 201 Cal. App. 4th 758 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) to support its "fixed" argument. In its analysis, the California Court of Appeals case 
dealt with a provision in California's constitution which differs greatly from Idaho's Art. VIII,§ 3. 
Case law interpreting California's constitution is irrelevant when interpreting Idaho's constitution. 
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The California provision required a two-thirds vote of each house of the California legislature for 
any unbudgeted expenditure exceeding $300,000. A California state agency contracted to pay 
certain mitigation costs, but only if the mitigation costs exceed $133 million. The California court 
held the California constitution was not yet violated because no one knew whether the mitigation 
costs would exceed the $133 million threshold. At the time of the litigation, there was only a 
theoretical potential that the state would have to pay anything under the agreement. The California 
Court of Appeals reasoned that such a potential contingent obligation did not violate the California 
constitution unless and until the contingency occurred. Essentially, the California case was about 
ripeness. At the time of the litigation, the state was not obliged to pay anything. If the contingency 
happened, the payment obligation may have violated the California constitution. Quant(fication 
provides no support for the City's position. The JPA created a real, not a potential, liability. Even 
though the exact amount of the JP A obligation was not determined when the JP A was executed, it 
is clear that IHD was obligated to pay large sums to the City in each future year. IHD made 
payments to the City every year since 2003, and according to the City's Complaint, must continue 
payments to the City every year into perpetuity. Under the City's reasoning, a variable interest rate 
multi-year mortgage obligation would not be a "liability" under Art. VIII, § 3 because the exact 
future payments are not yet "fixed". This analysis is inconsistent with Idaho case law. 
The City argues Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931) to support its 
"fixed" liability theory. Emmett was obligated to make future lease payments on a lease/purchase 
of sprinkler equipment. There was no non-appropriation clause, or walk-away provision, in the 
agreement. This Court held the agreement violated Art. VIII, § 3 because Emmett did not have 
funds available for all future lease/purchase payments in the year the agreement was signed; 
referred to in GBAD as the "aggregation principle." GBAD *9. Williams held that the City's 
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pledge of its future revenues created an indebtedness or liability in violation of Art. VIII, § 3. 
There was no distinction in Williams between "fixed" versus "non-fixed" liabilities. The Williams 
holding followed the Feil analysis that Art. VIII, § 3 unequivocally prohibits pledging any revenues 
beyond the year in which the obligation was incurred. Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 55, 129 P. 643, 651. 
Based on Feil and Williams, the JPA violated Art. VIII, § 3 because the JPA created an IHD 
liability to the City into the indefinite future, not because the liability was "fixed." In any case, 
GBAD clarifies that the framers of the Idaho Constitution intended the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition to 
apply to contingent liabilities, and is not limited to "fixed" liabilities. 
B. The City Incorrectly Argues "That Year" Means Any Future Year 
The City perpetuates the trial court's error by asserting the JPA is legal because IHD's 
future liability does not exceed IHD's future revenue for any future year. All Idaho cases, 
including GBAD, construe the phrase "that year" in Art. VIII, § 3 to mean the year in which the 
agreement was entered; not future years. Future years' revenues cannot be considered in the Art. 
VII, § 3 analysis. Future years' liability includes all future obligations. This "aggregation 
principle" mandates that all future JP A payments be aggregated when an agreement such as the JP A 
contains no walk away clause. 
Accordingly, governmental subdivisions are liable for the aggregate 
payments due over the total term of a contract rather than merely for what is 
due the year in which the contract was entered. 
GBAD, *8-9 (emphasis added). 
It is the pledge of future years' revenue that is problematic; not whether the pledge of some 
future year's revenue potentially equals or exceeds that future year's liability. Based on Boise Dev. 
Co., Williams, and GBAD, there is a present liability or aggregation for all future years' payments 
at the time of execution of a multi-year agreement. Because IHD's aggregate JPA obligation (an 
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estimated $350,000 per year into perpetuity) exceeds IHD's 2003 revenue, the JPA violated Art. 
VIII,§ 3. 
C. The City Incorrectly Argues Art. VIII, § 3 is Inapplicable 
to Agreements which "Apportion" Funds 
The City tries to remove the JPA from the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition with the novel 
proposition that the JPA is merely an agreement to apportion funds, or divide revenue. For 
example, "(t)he JPA is simply ... an agreement on the division of revenue. That is not a debt or a 
liability of a sum certain." Respondent's Brief, p. 26. Ironically, the City fails to acknowledge that 
the apportioned funds belong to IHD. Calling them "apportioned funds" when they belong to one 
entity and must be paid to the other entity based upon an agreement is merely another way of 
saying that the JP A agreement requires IHD to pay its revenues to the City based on an ongoing 
liability. 
The language of Art. VIII, § 3 contains no exclusion for agreements which apportion or 
divide one entity's funds and pays them to another entity based upon an agreement. The long-
established case law from Feil to GBAD rejects such an approach. In Feil, Buhl, Asson v. City of 
Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983) and City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 
388 (2006), each of the agreements apportioned revenues generated from the acquisition of 
equipment or improvement projects to pay off the debt associated with the acquisition. 
Notwithstanding such "apportionment" of revenues, the agreements were held to be illegal. The 
City's "apportionment" of revenue argument is really the special fund doctrine argument in 
disguise. 
The City attempts to sneak the special funds doctrine through the back door by quoting from 
15 AfcQuillin Afun Corp §41:22 (2013) "If an obligation is payable out of a special fund only, and 
the municipality is not otherwise liable, it is held that there is no indebtedness." Respondent's 
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Brief, p. 25. McQuillin may state a general principal applicable in some states, but when it comes 
to Idaho local government financing, Idaho has repeatedly rejected the more liberal constitutional 
debt prohibition interpretations from other states. In Idaho, future revenues which may become 
available from whatever source become income or revenue within the meaning of the constitution. 
Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 55, 129 P. 643, 651 (1912). 
The City continues its advocacy for the special fund doctrine by suggesting that if the 
repayment of the JPA obligation is made only from the revenue generated from City properties, 
then Art. VIII, § 3 is not implicated. "The amount paid can never exceed the amount collected." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 23. So what? Based upon long-established Idaho jurisprudence, future 
revenues cannot be included in the Art. VIII, § 3 analysis of whether future liability exceeds the 
agency's revenue for the year the obligation was incurred. The City compounds its error at p. 25 of 
its brief, noting that in California a "contract for reimbursement from revenues derived from a 
water main extension were not constitutional 'debts."' Because Idaho has rejected the special fund 
doctrine, the opposite is true in our state. 
The City relies heavily on California cases, McQuillan, and other non-Idaho cases to 
interpret the Idaho Constitution. See Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-25. As noted in Feil and GBAD, 
Idaho has one of the strictest, if not the strictest, debt/liability prohibition in the country. Writing in 
1912, this Court reasoned in Feil that cases from other states have no applicability in analyzing debt 
prohibitions under Idaho's Art. VIII, § 3. This Court described how other courts have "indulged in 
various subtleties and refinements of reasoning to show that no debt or indebtedness [had] 
occurred." Feil, 23 Idaho at 49, 129 P. at 649. Feil clarified that Idaho's conservative approach 
prohibits the pledging of "all sources and kinds of income or revenue." 23 Idaho at 49, 129 P. at 
649. GBAD affirmed this conservative approach just a few months ago. 
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In ~Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 483 (1930), this Court noted that other states, 
including California, have adopted the special fund doctrine. This Court flatly rejected those cases. 
This Feil and Buhl reasoning was reaffirmed by GBAD. 
In other words, pledging future revenues is prohibited regardless of how the revenue is 
generated or allocated. Art. VIII, § 3 prohibits pledging of future revenues "in any manner, or for 
any purpose." The pledge of future IHD revenues is the fatal flaw in the JP A. Art. VIII, § 3 
protects future IHD commissioners, tax payers and residents by ensuring that future IHD revenues 
are not dedicated to past liabilities and future revenues remain available to be used for the future 
needs and priorities of the voters who elect those future commissioners. Without a walk away 
provision, the JP A binds the hands of future IHD boards and voters and saddles future IHD 
commissioners and taxpayers with a long-term obligation, regardless of whether the JPA is 
analyzed as an apportionment of revenue. The 2003 IHD commissioners could only obligate IHD 
2003 revenues, not 2016 revenues or any other future years' revenues. 
D. The City Incorrectly Argues Jeff D. Supports the City's Arguments 
The City cites Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F. 2d 753 (9th Cir. 1990) to support its argument that 
multi-year agreements do not violate Art. VIII, § 3. Respondent's Brief, p. 21. Jeff D. is a 
continuation of the case of Evans v. Je.fJD., 475 U.S. 717, 106 S.Ct. 1531 (1986). In 1980, JeffD., 
on behalf of a class of indigent Idaho children suffering from emotional and mental disabilities, 
commenced a class action against the Governor of Idaho and other state officials, alleging they 
were provided inadequate care in violation of their state and federal statutory rights and in violation 
of their constitutional rights under the United States and Idaho constitutions. The complaint sought 
only declaratory and injunctive relief. In 1983, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that 
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offered injunctive relief to the class members. The district court entered the agreement as a consent 
decree in April 1983. See JejfD. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278,281 (9th Cir. 2011). 
This case is inapposite to the issues raised in this appeal. Art. VIII, § 3 was not analyzed in 
Jeff D. The defendant was the State, not a political subdivision. Further, the stipulated injunctive 
relief was unrelated to declaration of a multi-year debt owed by the state to the disabled children. 
Jeff D. does not pertain to the constitutional issues raised in the present case. 
V. GBAD SUPPORTS IHD'S ARGUMENTS 
AND REFUTES CITY'S ARGUMENTS 
The City relies heavily on GBAD. IHD agrees that a proper understanding of GBAD is 
crucial to resolution of this case. 
GBAD initially reaffirmed that a liability prohibited by Art. VIII, § 3 is one in which the 
political subdivision "is bound in law and justice to do something which may be enforced by 
action." GBAD *8, quoting from Feil. The Court then emphasized "obligating oneself to future 
payments .. .is a present liability" prohibited by Art. VIII, § 3. GBAD *9. 
The key to Art. VIII, § 3 cases is a walk-away or termination clause. The GBAD agreement 
contained a non-appropriation clause which allowed GBAD to walk away from the agreement each 
year. GBAD was "bound only for the one year term", GBAD *9, unless GBAD affirmatively 
renewed the agreement each year. The GBAD agreement approved by this Court is starkly different 
from the JP A since IHD has no ability to terminate the JP A or to even renegotiate it absent the 
City's consent. As the City emphasized, the JPA was intended to be a permanent liability, 
therefore there were no provisions in the JPA for termination or renegotiation by IHD. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. 
Even if the JP A obligation is analyzed as a "contingent" liability, it is prohibited by Art. 
VIII, § 3. GBAD held that contingent multi-year liabilities are subject to the Art. VIII, § 3 
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prohibition. GBAD. Only theoretical or potential liabilities are outside the Art. VIII, § 3 
prohibition. "The framers, while being quite concerned with incurring contingent liabilities, were 
not worried about all potential liabilities." GBAD *11 (emphasis added). The lower court held 
GBAD had not disproved the possibility of all potential liabilities because the bank could 
theoretically exercise potential remedies beyond the first year of the agreement. This Court 
emphasized the nature of the potential liability by stating, "the district court never identified what 
such a remedy could be." GBAD * 1 O; and "[it] is difficult to conceive of a set of facts under which 
(the bank) could recover against the District .... " Id. The relevant determination under Art. VIII, § 3 
is whether the governmental subdivision presently bound itself to a liability greater than it has funds 
to pay for in the year in which it bound itself." Id. 
Justice Eismann emphasized this point in his concurring opinion. "[I]t is clear that the word 
liability meant a legal responsibility that could be enforced in a court of law." GBAD *20. 
"Liability" must be something more than a mere theoretical or moral obligation. Multi-year 
obligations prohibited by Art. VIII, § 3 include obligations, such as the JP A, where the political 
subdivision can be sued to enforce the obligation. Clearly, the City sued IHD to enforce this multi-
year obligation asserting that the JP A constituted a multi-year obligation. 
GBAD reiterated the "aggregation principle" set forth in Williams: 
GBAD at *10. 
The relevant determination under Article VIII, section 3 is whether the 
governmental subdivision presently bound itself to a liability greater than it 
has funds to pay for in the year in which it bound itself. 
IHD did not have the money on hand in 2003 to make all payments for the perpetual 
duration of the JP A. Therefore, IHD was required to seek voter approval. Because IHD entered 
into a multi-year obligation without voter approval, Article VIII, § 3 was violated. 
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VI. POLICY ARGUMENT 
The City concedes "the JP A does affect the ability of future IHD Boards to decide how its 
tax revenues should be spent." Respondent's Brief, p. 33. Despite this admission, the City argues 
the constitution was concerned only with financially distressed local government agencies, not with 
undermining the discretion of future elected officials. It is true that the framers were concerned 
with agencies bankrupting themselves. However, the framers' concerns were broader than that. 
GBAD clarifies that the framers intended to prevent agreements "which could bind future officials 
or taxpayers." GBAD *13. The Constitution prohibits multi-year commitments not fully funded in 
the first year of the agreement. Under the JP A, future IHD commissioners and taxpayers are 
perpetually bound to levy property taxes and to pay IHD general fund revenues to the City. Future 
IHD boards have no discretion whether to levy taxes and district taxpayers have no vote on the 
allocation of the revenues being spent. Because there is no walk away provision, there is no 
discretion whether to pay the collected taxes to the City. The agreement violated Art. VIII, § 3 by 
providing that future lHD commissioners had no authority over expenditure of future IHD revenues 
to satisfy a pre-existing liability. Future commissioners cannot exercise their judgment in spending 
decisions to best serve the taxpayers in the cun-ent year due to the pre-existing liability. Future 
voters cannot elect future IHD commissioners who will spend future IHD funds according to the 
will of the electorate. Part of the policy behind the Art. VIII, § 3 prohibition was to prevent future 
boards and taxpayers from losing the ability to decide how future revenues should be spent, unless 
approval from two-thirds of the citizen-taxpayers was first received. The JP A violated this policy 
and so is void. 
If the Court concludes the JP A violated Art. VIII, § 3, the Court need not consider the 
following arguments regarding the Joint Powers Act, and penalties and interest. 
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VII. THE JPA DOES NOT CONTAIN A DURATION 
OR A TERMINATION CLAUSE 
The Idaho Joint Powers Act, Idaho Code section 67-2326, et seq. (the "Act") mandates all 
joint powers agreements contain a provision on "duration" and "methods ... (for) termination of the 
agreement." The JP A contains neither. As noted by the City, the JPA was intended to be 
"permanent" which is why it had no provision for termination or renegotiation. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 16. Based on the paiiies' intent that the agreement be permanent, the JP A provided that 
"the duration of the agreement shall be perpetual" or until the parties "jointly and together agree to 
amend or terminate the same." R. p. 37. 
A perpetual agreement violates the statutory requirement for a statement of duration. 
"Duration" necessitates an end point. A joint agreement is not a method for termination. There is 
no way for either party to terminate the agreement without the consent of the other party. If that 
consent is withheld, the agreement lasts forever. Without an ability to terminate or renegotiate the 
JP A, the consequence in the present is a permanent liability, a permanent transfer of jurisdiction 
and a permanent transfer of statutory authority. 
The City argues "perpetual" is a duration and that the method of termination is by joint 
agreement. Neither IHD nor the City located any Idaho case authority directly on point, so this 
appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho. The City points to out-of-state cases which 
enforced "perpetual" agreements. The first is Bell v. Leven, 90 P.3d 1286 (Nev. 2004). Bell 
involved a contract dispute between private parties. Bell interpreted no state statute requiring a 
duration or method of termination. Bell stated "We agree that as a matter of public policy, courts 
should avoid construing contracts to impose a perpetual obligation", unless the contract explicitly 
states it is intended to be permanent. Bell, 90 P.3d 1286, 1288. 
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A review of the remaining cases cited by the City supporting perpetual contracts reveals 
they are not useful in resolving the present case. They are all decided on general contract law 
principles, and address no similar statutory requirement for governmental contracts to include a 
clause addressing duration and method of termination as exists in the present case. None of the 
City's cases involve public agencies with statutory powers and duties which may be violated by a 
perpetual agreement. 
The City's interpretation of the Act not only vitiates legislative intent as expressed in the 
statutory language, but may also lead to poor public policy and mischief. Pursuant to the City's 
analysis, Idaho agencies could enter into agreements to permanently transfer jurisdiction and other 
statutory powers without a vote of the people and without authorization from the legislature. This 
case illustrates the point. In the JPA and accompanying MOU, IHD and the City permanently 
transferred jurisdiction over City streets without following the statutory procedures for altering 
jurisdiction. See City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 
P.3d 905 (2003) ("Sandpoint II") (discussing the proper process for transferring jurisdiction). IHD 
and the City also permanently transferred all jurisdiction and authority for the vacation of City 
streets, including altering the statutory requirements for conducting public hearings on vacations 
and abandonments. R. 38, 43, 44. It is unlawful for Idaho local governments to delegate the 
authority and duty to conduct public hearings from one agency to another. Blaha v. Board of Ada 
County Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (2000). Disregard of the statute is further found in the 
failure to either establish a separate legal entity to conduct the joint or cooperative undertaking or to 
provide for an administrator or a joint board responsible for administering the joint or cooperative 
undertaking. LC. § 67-2328(d). 
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This Court can avoid the mischief likely to result from the City's interpretation by 
concluding that a "perpetual" agreement with no ability to renegotiate or terminate violates the 
statutory requirement for a "duration" clause and fails to meet the requirement that the JP A include 
a method for termination. 
The Act contemplates a concurrent or joint exercise of powers, not a permanent abdication 
of authority or a permanent transfer of jurisdiction. Future commissioners should be free, as a 
matter of public policy, to exercise their statutory authority as they see fit, and not be boxed in by 
agreements entered by prior boards which take away some or all of their statutory authority to act 
on behalf of the voters they were elected to serve. This Court should take the same conservative 
approach toward interpreting multi-year obligations under the Joint Powers Act that Idaho takes in 
interpreting multi-year obligations under Art. VIII, § 3. 
VIII. ESTOPPEL CANNOT SA VE THE VOID JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT 
A. Idaho does not permit Estoppel to save an Agreement Prohibited by 
the Constitution. 
The City proffers estoppel on appeal to rescue the void JP A. The City raised estoppel in 
response to the motion to dismiss. The trial court decided because the JP A was constitutional, there 
was no need to address judicial estoppel or equitable estoppel. There is a huge hole in the City's 
estoppel argument. This Court has repeatedly held that estoppel cannot be used to validate 
agreements which violate Art. VIII, § 3. 
Deer Creek Highway District v. Doumecq Highway District, 37 Idaho 601, 218 P. 371 
(1923) is precisely on point. In Deer Creek this Court held a multi-year agreement to construct a 
bridge across the Salmon River void in violation of Art. VIII, § 3. Doumecq Highway District 
("Doumecq") agreed to pay one third of the cost of the bridge, but after the bridge was built 
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reneged on the deal. The contract violated Art VIII, § 3 because it was a multi-year obligation 
exceeding Doumecq's revenue for the year in which the agreement was entered. Despite the 
apparent unfairness of Doumecq' s actions, this Court stated: "it is elementary that there can be no 
recovery on a void contract." Deer Creek, 37 Idaho 601,606,218 P. 371,372. 
The Deer Creek Highway District (DCHD) built the bridge and sought to recoup from 
Doumecq its contractual share of the construction costs. DCHD argued even though the agreement 
violated Art. VIII, § 3, estoppel should require Doumecq to perform its obligation - exactly the 
argument the City now asserts against IHD. 
This Court definitively disposed of the estoppel argument, holding: "when the contract is 
absolutely and directly prohibited by some statutory or constitutional enactment, the contract is 
void and it cannot be enforced either as an express or implied contract..." Deer Creek at 608, 218 
P. at 373. "An estoppel can never be invoked in aid of a contract which is expressly 
prohibited by a constitutional or statutory provision." Deer Creek at 609, 218 P. at 373, 
quoting from School District No. 8 v. Twin Falls County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 
1174 (1917). (Emphasis added.) 
Deer Creek unequivocally rebuts the City's estoppel argument. Deer Creek has been 
repeatedly reaffirmed by this Court. If ever an attractive estoppel argument was made, Deer Creek 
was it. Doumecq's citizens received the benefit of the bridge. Doumecq's failure to honor its 
obligation under the agreement resulted in detriment to DCHD and its citizens. Yet, because the 
multi-year obligation was void in violation of Art. VIII, § 3, estoppel could not be invoked to 
remedy the manifest injustice suffered by DCHD. 
The Deer Creek court concluded its reasoning with an explanation of why estoppel could 
not be used to alleviate the apparent unfairness of the holding. 
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"No sound reason occurs to us why a highway district should not be 
chargeable with the knowledge of the limitations of the lawful powers of 
other highway districts with which it seeks to contract. Municipal 
corporations must be required to take account of and obey the law whose 
creatures they are. 
Deer Creek, 37 Idaho 601,610,218 P. 371,373. 
The City and IHD in 2003 were both chargeable with knowing Idaho's longstanding Art. 
VIII, § 3 jurisprudence. Although their desire to resolve an ongoing litigation to the mutual benefit 
of their taxpayers was legitimate, they should have known they were entering an agreement which 
was void ab initio. 
Deer Creek has been followed and reaffirmed in numerous Idaho cases, including: J & J 
Contractors I O.T Davis Construction, A.JV v. Idaho Transportation Board, 118 Idaho 535, 797 
P.2d 1383 (1990); Jones v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, 93 Idaho 227, 459 P.2d 1009 (1969) 
(estoppel cannot be used in aid of a void contract); Whitney v. Continental Life and Accident 
Company, 89 Idaho 96, 403 P.2d 573 (1965) (if the agreement is void it cannot be treated as valid 
by invoking estoppel); Lloyd Crystal Post No. 20, The American Legion v. Jefferson County, 72 
Idaho 158, 237 P.2d 348 (1951) (an agreement prohibited by a statutory or constitutional enactment 
is beyond the power of a municipality to enter. Estoppel can never be invoked in aid of such an 
agreement.) 
Village of Heyburn, Idaho v. Security Savings & Trust Company, 55 Idaho 732, 49 P.2d 258 
(1935) is especially noteworthy in its reaffirmation of Deer Creek. This Court held that bonds 
issued in violation of Art. VIII, § 3 were void and estoppel could not be invoked to save the void 
agreement. The Court reasoned: 
The bar of the constitution against excessive municipal indebtedness would 
be very weak indeed to protect the taxpaying public if, when plainly 
overstepped, the resulting obligation could be enforced upon equitable 
grounds. No one can occupy a position of defiance to the fundamental law 
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and defend himself successfully thereunder by invoking the jurisdiction of 
equity. 
Village o_fHeyburn, 55 Idaho 732, 753, 49 P.2d 258, 267. Finally, Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 
Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931) cited and analyzed by the City in its Respondent's Brief and by this 
Court in GBAD reaffirmed Deer Creek. 
The City relies on City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 
145, 879 P.2d 1078 (1994) (Sandpoint I) to support its estoppel argument. In Sandpoint I, This 
Court declined to apply estoppel as requested by the City. This Court discussed the doctrine as a 
theoretical possibility. However, Sandpoint 1 did not involve allegations of a violation of Art. VIII, 
§ 3 as is now before the Court. Nor were there allegations of other constitutional or statutory 
violations which estoppel was invoked to overcome. The estoppel analysis in Sandpoint 1 does not 
affect the issues in the present case even though the same parties are once again before this Court. 
The City urges Murtaugh Highway District v. Twin Falls Highway District, 65 Idaho 260, 
142 P.2d 479 (1943) (A1urtaugh II) supports its argument. Murtaugh Highway District v. Twin 
Falls Highway District, 55 Idaho 400, 42 P.2d 1007 (1935) (Murtaugh I) sheds light on the estoppel 
holding of the court in the subsequent case. 
Twin Falls Highway District ("TFHD") was organized in 1918 or 1919. In 1922, the 
Murtaugh Highway District ("MHD") and Rock Creek Highway Districts ("RCHD") were 
organized out of territory taken from TFHD. The statute at the time, C.S. sec 1496 (later LC.A. § 
39-1509) provided land taken from the old district into the new district would continue to be liable 
for assessments by the old district for taxes to pay outstanding approved bonds as they became due. 
Section 1497, C.S. (later LC.A. 39-1510) provided the parent district could require the 
commissioners in the new district to levy an annual property tax on land in the new district to pay 
its share of the debt. TFHD interpreted the statute to require MHD to impose an assessment year to 
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year based upon the assessed value of the property in its district each year. The Supreme Court 
agreed, holding in Murtaugh I: "It would rather seem that when the rate of levy is fixed by the 
commissioners of the parent district it was the intention that such rate should apply to and be spread 
over the entire original territory of the parent district, and we so hold." Murtaugh I at 403. The 
Supreme Court found no different method of computation or rate of levy was intended to be used. 
Murtaugh I at 403-404. 
In Murtaugh II, the Supreme Court noted that there were ten bonds outstanding at the time 
of the division of the parent highway district. MHD claimed TFHD owed it a reimbursement for 
overpayment of its proportionate share of the bonds. TFHD required MHD and RCHD to levy an 
ad valorem tax slightly higher than the one imposed by TFHD for the years of 1932 through 1938. 
MHD claimed the levy should have been the same under the prior holding of the Supreme Court in 
Murtaugh l MHD claimed it paid $12,660.78 toward retirement of the bonds more than it should 
have had the levy been uniform in all three districts. However, TFHD made up the difference in the 
levy rate with money it received from motor vehicle license fees and paid its proportionate share 
towards retirement of the bonds. (MHD and RCHD also received motor vehicle license fees and 
did not apply their fees toward the debt.) 
In resolving the issue, this Court in Murtaugh II acknowledged that a highway district could 
apply motor vehicle license fees toward retirement of principal and interest on any outstanding 
bond, but it would not affect the levy apportionment pursuant to Sec. 39-2111, LC.A. Murtaugh II 
at 266. The Court reiterated the holding in Murtaugh I that the proportionate share of each districts 
debt would be computed based upon assessed valuation, and not the amount of license fees 
received. Murtaugh 11 at 267. 
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Despite the statutory requirements and prior holding in Murtaugh L this Court found it 
would be unjust to require TFHD to reimburse money to MHD because it would cause TFHD to 
pay a portion ofMHD's share of the bond debt. The Murtaugh JI Court held where a party 
consents or offers no opposition to an act which could not lawfully have been done without consent 
and induces the other from that which might otherwise be done, he cannot question the legality of 
past actions to the prejudice of those who acted on the fair inference to be drawn from the conduct. 
As further support for its !aches and estoppel holding, Murtaugh II recognized highway districts 
were in the category of purely business and proprietary corporations, and as such, laches and 
estoppel could be invoked against them. Id at 268. Murtaugh II involved a finite past obligation, 
not a future perpetual obligation. 
This case was revisited by this Court in Sandpoint I. This Court held "equitable estoppel, at 
a minimum, requires: a concealment or misrepresentation of fact; that the party asserting estoppel 
not have knowledge of the true facts; and that the misrepresentation must be relied on to the party's 
detriment. Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Ind. Hwy. Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994). See 
also Curry v. Ada County Highway District, l 03 Idaho 818, 654 P .2d 911 ( 1982). 
This minimum is not met in the present case. IHD did not conceal or misrepresent any fact 
to the City. It did not even misrepresent the law to the City. Both parties had legal counsel to assist 
them at the time. The parties made a mutual mistake of law which was not solely the fault of IHD. 
B. Judicial Estoppel is not Applicable. 
The City next argues more specifically that judicial estoppel precludes IHD from raising the 
illegality of the JPA under Art. VIII, § 3 and/or the Joint Powers Act. The City cites three cases: 
Hoaglund v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013); Indian Springs L.L.C. v. Indian 
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Springs Land Investment, L.L.C., 147 Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457 (2009); and Buckskin Properties, 
Inc. v. Valley County, 154 Idaho 486, 300 P.3d 18 (2013). 
Several matters are noteworthy: 
1. Judicial estoppel is a kind of estoppel which precludes a party from gaining an 
advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible 
position." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004). The rule set out in Deer 
Creek and its progeny that estoppel cannot be used to enforce an agreement void in violation of 
Idaho's constitution or statutes remains controlling Idaho law and applies equally to judicial 
estoppel; 
2. The three cases cited by the City apply to specific factual misrepresentations made to 
the court, not mutual mistakes of law as occurred in this matter; 
3. Two of the three cases assert estoppel against private parties, not political 
subdivisions; 
4. The JP A was never presented to or approved by the court. The settlement agreement 
was presented to the trial court only in the context of seeking an order of dismissal. There is no 
indication a hearing was held. Certainly, no Art. VIII, § 3 analysis was provided to or considered 
by the district court with respect to the JP A or the settlement agreement. There is no indication the 
court analyzed the JP A or the settlement agreement for compliance with Art. VIII, § 3 or the Joint 
Powers Act; and 
5. Even if the settlement agreement was "approved" by the district court, it does not 
differ from a judicial confirmation where the Supreme Court always gets the final word on the 
constitutionality and legality of an agreement. 
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Hoaglund v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013) does not support the City's 
judicial estoppel argument. Hoaglund involved an attempt to resurrect a wrongful death claim 
which Hoaglund had previously voluntarily dismissed. Hoaglund told the court one thing, and then 
later told the court the exact opposite in order to revive her wrongful death action. The court refused 
to condone her sworn inconsistent factual statements. There was no allegation of a violation of a 
statute or the constitution by a public agency. 
Neither does Buckskin Properties v. Valley County, 154 Idaho 486, 300 P.3d 18 (2013) 
support the City's judicial estoppel argument. Buckskin involved a developer who agreed to 
contribute road impact mitigation fees to Valley County to gain approval of development. A 
Development Agreement was entered into pursuant to which the developer paid fees. After the 
development was approved by the County, and the lot fees were paid, the developer sued the 
County for return of the fees. The Court held that the developer voluntarily paid the fees, received 
the benefit of the development agreement, and so could not now contend that he entered the 
agreement involuntarily. In Buckskin, the County adopted a resolution which made moot some of 
the developer's claims. In oral argument before the trial court, the County attorney stated the 
County had no intention of rescinding the resolution. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court ruling that the resolution rendered moot several of the developer's claims. The 
developer's claims were moot because the County no longer engaged in the conduct the developer 
was seeking to restrain. 
It was in response to the developer's hypothetical that the County might rescind its 
resolution and come back after the developer for illegal impact fees this Court discussed judicial 
estoppel. In dicta, the Court responded to the developer's hypothetical that judicial estoppel would 
protect the developer from future "sharp dealing or revision of Resolution 11-6 by the County", 
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Buckskin, 154 Idaho 486, 500, 300 P.3d 18, 29 (2013). In Buckskin, there was no assertion of an 
Art. VIII, § 3 violation as is present in this appeal. 
Buckskin is based upon Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). Loomis 
refutes the City's judicial estoppel argument. Loomis is apparently the first Idaho case to recognize 
judicial estoppel. Accordingly, Loomis provides important guidance regarding when and if judicial 
estoppel may be applied. 
Loomis was a passenger in a car driven by Church. Loomis was injured when the vehicle 
she was riding in collided with a Garret Freightlines truck. Loomis first sued Garret Freightlines 
and made sworn statements to the Court that Garrett Freightlines was solely responsible for the 
accident; and Church was free from fault. Loomis obtained a settlement from Garret Freightlines 
based on those sworn statements. 
Loomis then sued Church alleging directly opposite facts. In her lawsuit against Church, 
Loomis asserted that Church was not only at fault, but acted with reckless disregard by refusing to 
stop at a stop sign before crossing State Highway 26, even though Loomis asked Church to stop and 
Church verbally refused. 
Loomis' specific factual allegations in her sworn statements and pleadings in her second 
lawsuit were in direct contradiction with those in her first lawsuit. This Court was concerned these 
contradictory factual allegations created a fraud on the comis. The Court first identified the 
parameters of judicial estoppel: 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such sworn 
statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one party, he will 
not thereafter, by repudiating such allegations and by means of inconsistent and 
contrary allegations or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against 
another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Loomis, 76 Idaho 87, 93,277 P.2d 562,565 (citations [all from other states] omitted). 
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Idaho's foundational case for judicial estoppel requires sworn misrepresentations of fact. 
The doctrine has no applicability to a mutual mistake of law such as occurred when the JP A and the 
settlement agreement were signed. Here, there are no allegations of inconsistent sworn factual 
allegations arising to the level of a fraud upon the court. 
Finally, the City cites Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, 147 
Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457 (2009. Indian Springs also involved inconsistent sworn factual statements 
presented to the Court. In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, the holder of the mortgage alleged a 
principal balance of the note of $188,000 in one case, but then in a later case alleged a principal 
balance of $270,637.50. These contradictory factual allegations triggered the consideration of 
judicial estoppel. 
The Court stated that "[b ]ecause judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine existing to protect 
the dignity of the judicial process, it is invoked by the court at its discretion." 147 Idaho 737, 748, 
215 P.3d 457,469. The Court noted that " ... the party asserting judicial estoppel must show that the 
sworn statement at issue was used to obtain a judgment, advantage or consideration from another 
party." Indian Springs 737, 749, 215 P.3d 457, 469. (Emphasis added.) Because the party claiming 
judicial estoppel failed to show that the other party made sworn factual misstatements intending to 
gain an advantage, this Court refused the invitation to invoke judicial estoppel. 
Judicial estoppel cannot salvage the JP A. This Court has repeatedly held estoppel cannot be 
used to enforce an agreement which violates Article VIII, § 3. Judicial estoppel applies only to 
inconsistent sworn factual statements. Here, there was, at most, a mutual mistake of law. As stated 
in Indian Springs, the doctrine of judicial estoppel is invoked only at the discretion of the court to 
prevent an attack on the integrity of the judicial system where a litigant is playing fast and loose 
with specific factual representations made to the court. Here, there were no inconsistent sworn 
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factual statements that put the integrity of the court at risk. Rather, the City and IHD represented to 
the district court in 2003 they intended to enter into a JP A to resolve pending litigation. This 
representation was true. Certainly, had the parties represented to the district court they intended to 
enter a JPA that violated the Idaho constitution, the stipulation to dismiss would not have been 
granted by the district court. 
Unfortunately, the JPA as written included terms which were prohibited by the Constitution 
and the Joint Powers Act. Under such circumstances, judicial estoppel should not be invoked in 
this case. Equitable remedies should be invoked to support and uphold Idaho's Constitution and 
statutes; not to affinn void agreements made in violation of those provisions. 
The City argues that because the JP A was part of a settlement agreement, it should be 
immune from compliance with Idaho's constitution. The same question was before this Court in 
Boise Development Company, Ltd v. Boise City, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531 (1914). Boise entered 
into a multi-year agreement to settle on-going litigation. The Court held the settlement agreement 
violated Art. VIII, § 3 and accorded no preferential treatment to the agreement because it was a 
litigation settlement agreement. A void agreement is void even if the parties had a noble intent 
when the agreement was drafted. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OTHER APSECTS OF ITS DECISION 
A. The district court erred in declaring the City's rights under the JP A and 
the MOU. 
In its response the City claims it is undisputed that not all City residents paid their taxes on 
time. The City also claims IHD previously paid to the City all delinquent taxes owed as they were 
paid. The City ignores it is undisputed that IHD has never paid the City late fees and interest 
associated with the collection of delinquent taxes. R p. 236. 
31 
The City argues there can be only one reasonable interpretation of the contract. The City 
adopts the trial court's analysis, arguing the plain language of the contract required IHD to remit all 
gross amounts of money collected for IHD from City residents, regardless of whether it was for ad 
valorem taxes, penalties or interest. 
Returning to the fundamental proposition raised in the opening brief, if an agreement or 
contract is ambiguous, the resolution of any ambiguity raises a question of fact for the trier of fact. St. 
Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989); Mountainview Landowners Coop. 
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004). The preliminary question of whether 
a contract is ambiguous is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of 
Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P .2d 411, 414 ( 1995). When an instrument is 
ambiguous in nature, the intention of the parties as reflected by all of the circumstances in existence at 
the time the agreement was created must be considered in construing the agreement. Cusic v. Givens, 
70 Idaho 229,215 P.2d 297 (1950); Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243,250,270 P.2d 825, 829-30 (1954). 
An instrument which is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation is ambiguous. Latham v. 
Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). 
The City does not disagree that the contract does not define the terms property tax funds or tax 
revenues. The City does not address there is no uniformly recognized legal meaning for these terms. 
Instead, the City contends IHD's interpretation of the contract is unreasonable because it 
ignores the modifier "all" in the contract. The contract provided: 
"The District at the present time and in the future will levy and apply for ad valorem 
property taxes under the authority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40, Idaho Code. The 
District will pay over to the City all property tax funds from such District levies on all 
property located within the city limits. On the basis of present tax rates this amount is 
presently approximately $350,000 per year. District, upon receipt of tax revenues, 
forward to the City all tax revenues received by the District ... [sic]." 
Rp.39. 
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The City maintains this language is unambiguous and can have only one meaning. 
In an attempt to prove its point, the City notes under LC. section 40-805 the County has the 
obligation to pay to highway districts all district tax monies when they are collected, and to include in 
the County's final payment the district's proportionate amount of delinquent taxes, interest and costs 
on all tax sales and redemptions. The City claims the parties intended to incorporate this statute into 
interpreting the contract because the adjective "all" is utilized in the contract. In other words, the 
City's argument does not rely upon the plain wording of the contract. Instead, the City resorts to 
matters outside the contract to argue the intent of the parties at the time the contract was created. 
In advancing this argument, the City ignores that IHD has advanced a reasonable interpretation 
of the contract clause based upon the intent of the parties when the agreement was formed. 
To reiterate what IHD raised in its opening brief, the Idaho Constitution defines taxation as 
revenue gained by levying a tax on the value of property. Idaho Const. Article VII, section 2. The 
chapter and title of Idaho Code referenced in the JP A grants a highway district the power to levy ad 
valorem taxes. Idaho Code section 40-1309(3). Idaho Code section 40-801 reiterates this power, 
indicating that highway districts are empowered, for the purpose of construction and maintenance of 
highways and bridges under their jurisdiction, to make highway ad valorem tax levies. These tax 
levies are certified to the county auditor for tax collection and apportioned to the highway districts in 
the amount their levies produced exclusive of ordinary collection fees owed to the county. Idaho Code 
section 40-801 (2). These statutory provisions existed when the parties chose the language in the 
agreement and it was reasonable for IHD to interpret this clause to mean the payment of only the 
collected ad valorem taxes. 
When property taxes are delinquent, late charges and interest are assessed. Idaho Code section 
63-1002. Late charges are not defined as taxes. Idaho Code section 63-201(12). These code sections 
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were also in existence when the agreement was prepared. The City does not explain why it believes 
only Idaho Code section 40-805 controls interpretation of the contract or guides an analysis of the 
intent of the pmiies at the time the contract was formed. IHD contends the parties did not intend to 
include penalties and interest at the time the contract was executed. Its decade long course of dealings 
with the City reinforce this interpretation. 
The City perpetuates the district court's error by isolating its analysis to a few chosen words in 
the payment clause and ignoring the entire context of the agreement. The agreement mandated that 
IHD would levy and apply for ad valorem property taxes under the authority of Chapter 13, Title 40, 
Idaho Code. Following collection of the ad valorem taxes, the agreement required IHD to pay the City 
all property tax funds 'Yi·om such District levies." The tax funds referenced were those collected from 
IHD's levies. 
Late charges and interest are not a result ofIHD's levy. Rather, they are assessed later because 
of a delinquency in payment of the levy. A reasonable interpretation of this clause was IHD was to 
utilize its power to levy ad valorem taxes and pay to the City that portion of ad valorem taxes collected 
on real property located within the City. The trial court erred in determining the contract was 
unambiguous, and the only reasonable interpretation was that the contract required IHD to include in 
its payment to the City penalties and interest collected on delinquent taxes. 
B. The trial court erred in awarding damages to the City for breach of contract 
The City contends on appeal it only sought declaratory judgment and therefore had no 
obligation to prove an amount of past due penalties and interest it claimed was due. In its Final 
Judgment filed November 22, 2014, the trial court declared "[t]he Independent Highway District is 
directed to include in its payment of ad valorem taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-800 et seq., including without limitation any collection for past, 
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present or future delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of Independent 
Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint." R p. 386 (emphasis added). 
The district court also decreed post judgment interest at the legal rate would accrue until the 
judgment was paid in full. Id. 
The City claims it sought a declaration of rights pursuant to LC. section 10-1203. Relying 
upon Sweeney v. American Nat. Bank, 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 (1941), the City argues the trial 
court could both construe the contract and award damages pursuant to its request for declaratory 
judgment. The City also claims the only monetary relief it sought was the award of attorney fees. 
This claim contradicts the City's pleadings. Count One of the City's complaint indicated it was a 
claim for breach of contract. 
Further, the relief the trial court awarded was contrary to Idaho law. As set forth in Hull v. 
Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 331 P.3d 507, 516 (2014), the City had to prove it was injured by the 
breach of contract and the amount it was owed had to be proven with reasonable certainty. Even 
though the trial court acted within its powers to declare the rights of the parties, it could not excuse 
the City from meeting its burden of proof as a prerequisite to a damage award. 
The district court found IHD had breached the terms of the JP A by failing to include late 
charges and interest in the prior year's payments to the City. It ordered IHD to pay these 
unspecified amounts to the City. It was error for the trial court to require IHD in its judgment to 
include past amounts in its payment to the City when there was no evidence of damages from the 
alleged breach. The trial court erred in making such an order. 
C. The district court's permanent injunction was improper in form 
The City claims in its response to this issue it is premature for the trial court to enter a 
preliminary injunction because one is unnecessary given IHD's continuing payment of its 
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obligations under the contract. The City claims the issue was not before the trial court when it 
issued its final judgment. This claim is incorrect. If the final judgment included a permanent 
injunction, it had to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). The trial court's final 
judgment merely indicated "[a] permanent injunction shall issue with regard to the obligation." 
This permanent injunction failed to comply in form or scope with I.R.C.P. 65(d). The trial court 
erred in the entry of a permanent injunction using such vague language. 
D. The District Court erred in its award of attorney fees 
The City does not disagree four major motions were involved in this litigation: IHD's 
motion to dismiss, IHD's motion for permissive appeal, the City's motion for summary judgment 
and the City's motion for an award of attorney fees. The City contends that IHD failed to establish 
a lower prevailing rate for like work in the area. In advancing its argument, the City utilizes a very 
narrow definition of "like work". IHD utilized complex litigation as the standard for like work 
which it submitted to the district court. The City claims that the correct focus for like work is 
statutory construction and constitutional analysis. 
Litigation attorneys commonly engage in statutory construction. It is also not uncommon 
for litigation attorneys to utilize and analyze constitutional provisions, especially when working in 
the field of government finance. The City bolsters its argument by implying no local attorney in the 
First Judicial District had such experience necessitating the use by the clients of Spokane, 
Washington and Boise, Idaho attorneys. The City represents that the case started out with the City 
attorney and a Coeur d'Alene attorney, and then the clients reached out to more distant attorneys, 
implying such action was taken due to the inexperience of the local bar in such work. However, 
IHD started with a Boise attorney and then hired a local attorney to assist in the litigation. Thus, 
the City's argument rests upon a false premise. 
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On the attorneys who provided direct information to the district court regarding the 
prevailing rate in the local area, the City claims none would be competent to engage in developing 
the constitutional and statutory analysis which the City's outside counsel utilized. There is no such 
evidence before this Court. Every one of the attorneys who provided information of local rates 
have practiced for a quarter century or longer. Every one of them have engaged in complex 
litigation. They were all competent to testify to the prevailing rate for complex litigation in the 
local area. Their testimony was relevant and should not have been disregarded by the trial court. 
Mr. Andersen opined in his affidavit that the rates charged for legal services for his firm 
were prevailing and competitive in the area, and were reasonable and customary hourly rates for 
this type of legal work. In its response, the City claims "like work" is statutory and constitutional 
and statutory municipal corporate litigation, analysis. No support was provided by the City for this 
opinion. Mr. Andersen provided no information at the time of requesting attorney fees that local 
rates were different when a constitutional or statutory municipal issue were involved in the 
litigation, and IHD's counsel is unaware of such a distinction in the local bar. 
In response to the issue raised about Ms. Anderson's experience with Idaho law and lack of 
admission to practice in Idaho, the City correctly notes it could have applied for a pro hac vice 
admission. However, this observation does not address the substance ofIHD's argument regarding 
Ms. Anderson's time expended in the matter. The City claims that "like work" is constitutional and 
statutory municipal corporate litigation, not complex litigation. Neither Mr. Andersen or Ms. 
Anderson were identified as primarily practicing in constitutional and statutory municipal corporate 
litigation. Ms. Anderson was characterized in the request for attorney fees as spearheading the 
firm's general litigation research for all major litigation. In other words, she was identified as 
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specializing in complex litigation. Thus, the comparison of the rates to local attorneys dealing in 
complex litigation was appropriate. 
The City also claims IHD's position understates the magnitude and complexity of the issues 
raised in the district court, and these factors were reflected in the time spent and hourly rate 
charged. The City contends the need for immediate and successful resolution also was a factor in 
awarding a larger amount of attorney fees. Rule 54 contains no such factor. I.R.C.P. 54( e ). The 
closest factor is 54(e)(3)(F), which allows considering time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances of the case. However, this factor was not argued below or analyzed by the trial court 
as a factor it considered in awarding the fee. The City enunciates no reason on appeal why this 
factor would dictate an award higher than the prevailing local rate. 
The trial court drew no distinction between complex civil litigation and litigation involving 
constitutional provisions and statutory interpretation. Rather, the trial court focused upon longevity 
of time practiced by the attorneys performing the City's legal work. As set forth in the opening 
brief, the district court engaged in no analysis of the prevailing rate for like work in the geographic 
area in its award. 
The City further maintains its time was not excessive because statutory and constitutional 
issues were involved. The City contends the amount of time dedicated to the summary judgment 
was a function of IHD filing a response in the summary judgment. In its opening brief, IHD 
carefully analyzed and allocated the time the City spent on specific tasks. That time included 1.5 
hours to prepare a response to an auditor at the cost of $487.50. R. p. 327. Such response was 
unrelated to the litigation, but the district court awarded attorney fees for this unrelated item. 
The remaining time which was devoted to the motion practice was excessive. While the 
constitutional analysis required a review of several cases spanning decades, the case law was well 
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established. The City presented no argument to overrule that law. IHD recognizes the litigation 
was complex, but it was not of such a magnitude that justified the time dedicated to the motion 
practice which occurred. 
The heart of the case was two documents; the JPA and an MOU. No discovery occurred. 
The case was decided on motion practice. Under such circumstances, IHD submits the time 
devoted to the motion practice was excessive as outlined in its opening brief. 
Regarding the amount involved and the results obtained, no evidence was ever admitted in 
the record regarding the amount involved. The City claimed, without support, in its memorandum 
of costs that the amount exceeded $300,000. R. p. 311. It also said that IHD sought recoupment of 
the entire amount paid plus interest, which was rejected and summary judgment granted for the 
City. Id. At no time did IHD raise recoupment as an affirmative defense. IHD raised other 
defenses in its motion to dismiss, but recoupment was not one of them. While summary judgment 
was granted to the City, no such defense was ever advanced by IHD. 
The City contends the trial court did not err in giving the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G) factor the 
most weight in its award of attorney fees. While consideration of the factor is not inappropriate, the 
trial court's use of it as a punitive measure was inappropriate. It is clear from the trial court's 
holding it utilized this factor as a punitive measure against IHD for raising the constitutional issue. 
Rule 54 utilizes no punitive component as a factor the trial court is to consider in awarding fees. 
The City claims other factors support its position. It did not raise these other factors to the 
trial court. The City maintains the City Attorney worked on the case, yet his efforts were not 
reflected in the fees requested by the City. The City gives no explanation why the City Attorney's 
time was excluded by the City in its fee request. The City should not be allowed to reinforce its fee 
request on appeal by claiming unreported time which it never raised or argued below. 
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E. A New Trial Judge should be assigned on Remand 
This Court twice, has assigned a new judge on remand, both cases which originated in the 
First Judicial District. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 424, 283 P.3d 
728, 741 (2012); Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. The Go(lClub at Black Rock, LLC, _ P.3d _, 
2015 WL 5719996 (September 30, 2015). In Capstar, this Court found a new presiding judge 
would provide a much needed fresh perspective and eliminate any concerns relating to the repeated 
assertions of judicial bias. In Sky Canyon, this Court replaced the district court on remand following 
a position by the trial court characterized as ridiculous. 
In this matter, the district judge took several opportunities to express his displeasure with 
IHD's position, even relying upon facts that weren't in the record, pre-determining issues before 
they were ripe, introducing arguments not presented by the City, and preventing IHD from being 
heard on its presentment of judgment by entering another judgment (not proper in form). 
The City contends forum shopping is not favored. IHD does not disagree. However, another 
precept of trial practice is all parties are entitled to a fair and unbiased decision maker in a litigation. 
It is the job of the attorneys to be advocates for the parties, not the trial judge. From IHD's 
perspective, the trial court abandoned its proper role and became an advocate for the City, even 
pointing out to the City when it was not relying upon the proper statute for attorney fees. The trial 
court was so eager to rush to judgment, it even ignored crucial deadlines. Assuring the parties have 
such a fair tribunal does not violate I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l) as suggested by the City. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The City has advanced a request for attorney fees on appeal under I. C. section 12-11 7. IHD 
does not believe the City should prevail on appeal, and would not qualify for attorney fees on 
appeal. 
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The City also claims it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to LC. section 12-121. While 
advocating on the one hand this case is complex in scope and magnitude because of the 
constitutional and statutory issues, the City maintains in this portion of its argument that the case is 
merely about a contractual obligation IHD failed to perform. 
IHD's position on appeal was not frivolous. The district court's analysis was flawed in 
several aspects. IHD has brought forward a meritorious appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The framers mandated a pay-as-you-go system for Idaho local governments. Idaho local 
government agencies cannot bind future governing boards to multi-year obligations without walk-
away provisions that preserve future discretion. The JP A binds future IHD commissioners into 
perpetuity with no ability to make a choice to walk away from the agreement each year. It is this 
choice the Framers sought to protect by prohibiting debts or liabilities that take that choice away. 
Prior IHD elected officials cannot deprive future elected officials of having authority over how to 
spend future IHD revenues, absent a vote of the people. 
DATED this 3th day of February, 2016. 
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